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of the tenant, and for forcibly thrusting them into the street, or
attempting to do so, he would be liable to such damages as a
jury might deem the case to require.
A landlord, however, would have the right to enter upon the
possession of his tenant for certain purposes, as to demand rent,
or to make necessary repairs; and we must be understood as confining the action of trespass quare clausum by the tenant against
the landlord, even for the recovery of nominal damages, to those
cases where an action of forcible entry and detainer would lie under
our statute. By the application of this rule much of the apparent conflict in the authorities can be explained.
Reversed and remanded.
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Court of Common Pleas.
APPLEBY v. MEYERS.
The plaintiffs agreed to make and erect, on premises under the control of the
defendants, certain machinery, and the latter were to provide all necessary brickwork, &c. Before the works were completed, the buildings in which the work waus
to be done were destroyed by fire :-Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover
for the amount of work done. It was an implied term of the contract, that the
defendant should provide the buildings in which the work was to be done, and
enable the plaintiffs to perform their part; and therefore, that the defendant was
not relieved by the occurrence of the fire; as a party who contracts to do a thing
is bound to carry out his engagement, or to make compensation, notwithstanding
he is prevented by inevitable accident.

THis was an action brought by the plaintiffs, who are engipeers, against the defendant, to recover the sum of 4191., for
work done and materials provided, under, the circumstances hereinafter stated. It came before the court on a case stated, without
any pleadings, under the Common Law Procedure Act.
1. On the 30th March 1865 the plaintiffs entered into a certain
agreement with the defendant. The material portion of it is set
out, and was as follows :"Specification and estimate of engine, boiler, lifts, &c., for B.
Meyers, Esq., Southwark Street, Messrs. Tillott & Chamberlain,
Architects. March 30th 1865.
[Here follows list of boiler, engine, &c., to be made.]
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"We offer to make and erect the whole of the machinery of the
best materials and workmanship of their respective kinds, and to
put it to work, for the sums above named respectively, and to
keep the whole in order, under fair wear and tear, for two years
from the date of %completion. All brickwork, carpenters' and
masons' work, and materials, are to be provided for us, but the
drawings and general instructions required for them to work to,
will be provided by us, subject to the architect's approval.
"APPLEBY BROTHrS."
(Signed)
2. The total costs of the said works, if they had been completed
under the said contract, would have amounted to 4591.
3. On the 4th July 1865 a fire accidentally broke out on the
premises of the defendant, in Southwark Street, which entirely
destroyed the said premises, and the works which then had been
erected by the plaintiffs in part performance of the contract above
set out; at the time of the fire, the works contracted to be erected
as aforesaid, had not been completed.
4. The premises upon which the several works were to be
erected were the property of the defendant, in his occupation,
and under his entire control. The plaintiffs had access thereto
only for the purpose of performing their contract. At the time
of the fire, portions of the items, numbered 1 to 8, were erected
*and fixed, and some of the materials for others were on the premises. The defendant had not completed the carpenters' and
masons' work to be prepared by him under the said agreement.
The tank had been erected by the plaintiffs, and was used by the
defendant, by taking water therefrom for the purpose of his business, but the other apparatus connected with it, as specified in
No. 8, were not completed. The plaintiffs' workmen were still
engaged in continuing the erection and completion of the same at
the time of the fire.
The question for the opinion of the court was, whether, under
the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover
for the whole or any portion of the contract price.
If the court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled
to recover for the whole, judgment was to be entered up for the
plaintiffs for 4121. 10s.
If the court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled
to recover for part only, then judgment was to be entered for
VoL. XV.-8
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such sum as an arbitrator should direct, he having power to
certify for costs if necessary. In either case, with costs of suit.
If the court should be of opinion in the negative, then judgment of non pros., with costs of defence, was to be entered up
0
for the defendant.
HoU, for the plaintiffs.-The value of the work done .at the
time of the fire should be assessed. By referring to paragraph 4
of the case, it will be found that, at the time of the fire, portions
of items in the contract mentioned were erected and fixed, and
some of the materials for others were on the ground. The tank,
too, was in actual use by the defendant. Here, a portion of the
work was affixed to the freehold of the defendant, and therefore
all interest in them had passed to him. Suppose the defendant
had paid the plaintiffs something on account, could -it have been
recovered back? Menetone v. Athawes, 8 Burr. 1592, where it
was decided that the value of repairs may be recovered though a
ship be burnt in dock, is almost precisely in point. [ifannen.It is found that no single portion was complete; paragraphs 3
and 4 of the case show that it was so.] Suppose the defendant
had sold the premises, could it be contended that the things
affixed- to the freehold did not pass ? Story on Bailments, § 426,
7th ed., is in my favor,.for the plaintiffs were employed in adding
their labor and property to the premises of their employer. As
the defendant could not supply that which would enable the
plaintiffs to finish their contract, surely the latter are entitled to
payment.
iannen, for the defendant.-The payment depends. on a condition precedent , that the works should be finished.. In Menetone
v. Athiavies there was no stipulation as to the time when the
works should be completed: Chit. Cont. 5"14, 7th ed. In Adlard
v. Booth, 7 Car. & P. 108, it was decided, that where a printer
has been employed to print a work, of which the impression is to
be a certain number of copies, if a fire break out and consume
the premises before the whole number have been worked off, the
printer cannot recover anything, although a part have actually
been delivered. Suppose that the different parts of the contract
are separable, then each has to be done complete. [KEATING,
J.-Suppose a fire had occurred after completion of the works',
but before expiration of the two years ?I But when the fire
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broke out, the time for payment had not arrived; it was our
common misfortune. Taylor v. Caldwell, 32 L. J. Q. B. 164,
supports this view. [ERLE, 0. J.-The fire has come on the
defendant's premises, and hindered the plaintifs from completing.],
Here is an accident by the act of God, which neither party can
foresee, and it must be so treated.
IToll, in reply.-The case of Taylor v. Caldwell is in my
favor, for it was seeking to enforce a claim for damages when the
hall ceased to exist, and I say that these buildings of the defendant's being burnt down, excuses the plaintiffs from carrying out
the remainder of the contract, but does not exclude them from
being paid for what they have done. The fire in the case of
Adlard v. Booth, which has been referred to, took place on the
plaintiff's own premises. [KEATING, J., referred to Boberts v.
Havelock, 3 B. & Ad. 404, where a shipwright was allowed to
maintain an action for work done in the way of repair to a ship,
though the repair was incomplete, and the vessel was thereby
kept from coiitinuing her voyage at the time when the action was
brought.]
Cur. adv. vult
June 12.-SmiTH, J., delivered the judgment of the court.In this ease the plaintiffs, who are engineers, had contracted, by
an agreement in writing with the defendant, to do certain works
upon buildings on his premises, &c. ; to provide and erect upon
them a steam-engine, and machinery connected with it. The
works were divided into different parts, and separate prices were
fixed upon each of these parts. The plaintiffs agreed to provide
and erect the machinery for those prices.
The case finds that the premises were in the occupation and
under the entire control of the defendant. That all parts of the
works were far advanced towards completion ; that some parts
were so nearly finished, that the defendant had used them for the
purposes of his business, but that none of the parts into which the
work had been divided were absolutely complete.
The works were in this state when an accidental fire broke out
on the defendant's premises, and destroyed the defendant's buildings, and the works done upon them by the plaintiffs.
The question submitted to us is, whether, under the circum
stances, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the whole, or any
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portion of, the contract price. It is clear the plaintiffs cannot
recover the whole contract price as a specific sum, for that was
only to be paid on the completion of the works-an event which
has not happened. But we think that, under the circumstances,
they are entitled, upon an implied contract, to be paid the value
of the work done, which value we assume, from the form of the
question, the parties are content to estimate upon a due proportion of the contract price. It was contended for the defendant,
that the fire was a common misfortune, excusing both parties
from a performance of the contract, and we were pressed to adopt
the principle laid down by the Court of Queen's Bench in the
case of Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826. In one part of that
judgment it is said, no doubt in general terms, "The principle
seems to us to be, that in contracts in which the. performance
depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a
condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising
from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the
performance."
The Court of Queen's Bench may have properly adopted and
applied this principle in the case of the contract before them, but
we think it cannot be correctly applied to the present case, where
the contract is of a different kind, and appears to us to fall within
the qualification of the principle found in the early part of the
same judgment, where the court say, that "in the asence of any
express or implied warranty that the thing shall exist," the contract is not to be construed as a positive contract, but as subject
to an implied condition, that the parties shall be excused by the
perishing of the thing before breach.
By the agreement between these parties, the machinery was to
be fixed to the buildings of the defendant, so that the parts of it,
when and as fixed, would become his projerty, and subject to his
dominion; and we think we fulfil the intention of those who
entered into this contract, by holding that it is an implied term
of it, that the defendant should provide the buildings, the subject
on which the work was to be done, and keep them in a fit state to
enable the plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract.
If the defendant had refused to allow the plaintiffs to have the
use of the buildings, or by his own act or default had rendered
them unfit to receive the work, there can, we apprehend, be no
doubt that the plaintiffs might either have sued for a breach of
the contract, or have treated the contract as rescinded, and have
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recovered the value of the work done on a quantm. valebit
account.
These rights of action would accrue to the plaintiffs, not by
reason of any express words of agreement, but in virtue of the
implied term of the contract to which we have referred.
Then, is the non-performance of this implied term, on the part
of the defendant, excused by the happening of an accidental fire ?
We think it is not excused by that event.
The general rule of law is clear, that when a man contracts to
do a thing, he is bound to do it or make compensation, notwithstanding he is prevented by inevitable accident.
We hold that an implied promise is present in this contract on
the part of the defendant to provide and keep up the buildings,
and, as a consequence, he must be liable in this case, unless we
6ught to annex a condition or exception to his promise, exonerating him from the perfo mance of it in the case of fire or other
accident.
3When the plaintiffs agreed to expend their materials and labor
on buildings of the defendant, of which he was to retain the possession and control, it is reasonable to infer that it was contemplated that the subject, on which the work was to be done, should
be provided and kept at his risk and peril, and it is unreasonable
to suppose that the parties intented, that if a fire happened, in no
way attributable to the plaintiffs, the defendant should be set free
from all obligation under the contract.
We think, that if we were to imply an exception or condition
having this effect, we should not fulfil but frustrate the real
intention of the parties. It appears to us, that such a. fire no
more excuses the defendant than an eviction of both plaintiffs
and defendant from the buildings by title paramount would have
done.
No decision directly in point was cited to us. But the learned
counsel on both sides referred to Story on Bailments, § 426, and
following sections, and each relied on certain passages as being'
in his favor. The application of the maxim "res perit dorzi o"
to cases of a kind, in some respects, like the present, is discussed
by the learned author. But the authorities he has collected
appear to leave open the precise question we have to decide in
this case.
The judgment of the court is for the plaintiffs to the extent
before indicated.

